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Abstract: Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the 
same rent seeking behavior as documented in the “curse of natural resources” literature. In this 
paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using panel data for 108 recipient 
countries in the period 1960 to 1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on institutions. 
In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five years reaches 
the 75
th percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.5 and 
almost one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political 
institutions. We find that aid is a bigger curse than oil. 
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Many studies have shown a negative correlation between economic growth and natural resources, a 
finding often dubbed “the curse of natural resources.”  However, oil and other minerals may not be 
the biggest curse in developing countries. In many of them, the amount of foreign aid is a far larger 
share of government revenues. In Burkina Faso, for example, aid accounted for two-thirds of the 
government budget and 8% of GDP over the period 1985-89. In Mauritania, it accounted for 60% 
and 22%, respectively, for the period 1980-84. In Rwanda, Vanuatu, Gambia, Niger, Tonga and 
Mali, foreign donors provided over a third of the government budget during some 5-year periods 
between 1960 and 1999. Some countries are chronically dependent on aid. Aid accounted for 40% 
of the government budget and 6.2% of GDP in Burkina Faso during 1960-1999. In Mauritania, for 
37% and 12%, respectively. 
 
A recent empirical literature has investigated the role of institutions on development. Mauro (1995, 
1998), Knack and Keefer (1999), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Easterly 
and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Rodrik (2004), among others, show a positive 
relationship between good institutions and development.  The literature on political institutions and 
growth is less developed. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004) find strong effects of democracy on 
growth. Persson (2004) shows that the form of democracy, rather than democracy versus non-
democracy has important consequences for the adoption of structural policies that promote growth. 
Barro (1991) and Glaeser et al (2004) find weaker effect of political institutions on growth.  
 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between aid and political institutions.
2 One view of this 
relationship suggests that aid is needed to advance democratic institutions in developing countries. 
In the words of Boutros Boutros Ghali: “We must help states to change certain mentalities and 
persuade them to embark on a process of structural reform. The United Nations must be able to 
provide them with technical assistance enabling them to adapt institutions as necessary, to educate 
their citizens, to train officials and to elaborate regulatory systems designed to uphold democracy 
and the respect for human rights.” A second view holds that foreign aid could lead politicians in 
power to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to appropriate these resources and try to exclude 
                                                 
2 This paper is related to the recent work on aid and growth. See Roodman (2007a) for a summary of the 
previous literature. 
  2other groups from the political process. By doing so political institutions are damaged because they 
became less democratic and less representative.  
 
Rajan and Subramanian (2007b) argue that foreign aid may reduce the need for taxes of 
governments and, therefore, be associated with weak governance. They propose an IV 
methodology to show that governance matters, using the growth of governance-dependent 
industries.  Knack (2004), using information on the Freedom House index, argues that there is no 
evidence that aid promotes democracy. By contrast, we use two variables, Checks and Balances of 
the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) and the democratic score of the Polity IV, to calculate 
the democratic stance of a country. In addition, we consider simultaneously the effect of foreign aid 
and other easily extractable resources (in particular oil) to avoid an omitted variable problem. Our 
findings support the view that foreign aid can damage institutions. The magnitudes of the effect are 
striking. If a country receives the average amount of aid over GDP over the whole period, then the 
recipient country would have gone from the average level of democracy in recipient countries in 
the initial year to a total absence of democratic institutions. Since most foreign aid is not contingent 
on the democratic level of the recipient countries, there is no incentive for governments to keep a 
good level of checks and balances in place.  
 
This is not to say that promoting better institutions should be the objective of foreign aid.
3 
However, as argued in Collier and Dollar (2004), at a minimum donors and international agencies 
should abide by the Hippocratic oath: do no harm.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses several theoretical arguments that can justify 
the effect of foreign aid on institutions. Section 3 presents the data and some preliminary findings. 
Section 4 contains the basic results. Section 5 considers a large set of robustness tests, like 
including additional controls, using alternative institutional variables and eliminating outliers. 
Section 6 includes a long discussion on the appropriateness of the instruments and the effect of 
using alternative instrumentation strategies. Section 7 contains the conclusions. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Indeed, the constitution of the World Bank prohibits such targeting. 
  32. The curse of natural resources and the effect of foreign aid 
 
The curse of natural resources has been documented in several studies. Sachs and Warner (2001) 
show that resource-rich countries grow slower than other countries and that this finding is robust to 
controlling for geography, resource abundance per capita and mineral versus agricultural resources. 
This corroborates previous studies, among them Sachs and Warner (1999) and Auty (1990). Some 
case studies also provide compelling explanation of the relationship between natural resources and 
civil wars (Ross 2003). 
 
Natural resources and foreign aid share a common characteristic: they can be appropriated by 
corrupt politicians without having to resort to unpopular, and normally less profitable, measures 
like taxation. However, there is less agreement with respect to the economic impact of aid. The 
literature on the effect of aid on growth is mixed. Boone (1996) finds, using a sample of developing 
countries, that aid has no effect on investment or growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000) qualify this 
result by including the role of policies: aid has a positive effect on growth in developing countries 
with ''good'' policies while it has no effect when countries follow ''poor'' policies. This latter result 
has been challenged recently by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), who find the result of 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) sensitive to sample size. Easterly (2003a) points out that the findings in 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) are also sensitive to the definition of foreign aid, policies and output 
per capita. Easterly (2003b, 2006) makes a broader argument on why aid frequently fails. A very 
recent study of Rajan and Subramaniam (2007a) finds little evidence of a positive (or a negative) 
effect of aid on economic growth. These authors do not find either evidence of aid working better 
in countries with better policy o geographic environment.  
 
Existing studies have documented several mechanisms that can explain why sudden windfalls of 
resources in developing countries have led to a decline in their growth rate. Although the specific 
description of the model is different the basic elements are common: individuals engage in rent-
seeking activities to appropriate part of the resources windfall and, by so doing, reduce the growth 
rate of the economy. In addition most of the theoretical arguments rely in the so-called tragedy of 
the commons. Lane and Tornell (1996) describe a growth model that incorporates ''common access'' 
to the aggregate capital stock as a reduced form of a situation where other groups can appropriate 
  4part of the returns of a group of individuals. They document the existence of the voracity effect: if 
powerful interest groups exist and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is not too low, then the 
growth rate of the economy will decline when there is a windfall of resources.  
 
One reason that can justify the small effect of foreign aid on growth is the generation of many rent-
seeking activities. The success of this rent seeking activities requires a low degree of accountability 
(checks and balances) and weak institutions. There is a large body of evidence on the rent-seeking 
activities generated by foreign aid. Svensson (2000) is concerned specifically with the effect of 
foreign aid in the context of economies with powerful social groups. In Svensson (2000) the 
different groups of the economy have common access to the government's budget constraint. The 
utility function of the individuals is the sum of their private consumption plus the part of the public 
good that corresponds to their locality. Individuals can increase their consumption by performing 
rent seeking activities to appropriate the revenue of the government. However, by doing that, they 
reduce the amount of local public goods provided. A large inflow of aid does not necessarily 
increase welfare since there is an increase in rent-seeking activities that is costly in aggregate terms. 
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) analyze using panel data from a unique survey of primary school in 
Uganda, the extent to which the foreign aid for education purposes actually reached the schools. 
They find that during the period 1991-1995 schools on average received only 13% of the grants 
received by the government. Moreover they show that other surveys in other African countries 
confirm that Uganda is not a special case. These results provide case studies evidence of the rent-
seeking activities generated by the reception of foreign aid. In extreme cases the extent of the rent 
seeking activities could lead to a civil conflict. Maren (1997) provides evidence that Somalia's civil 
war was caused by the desire of different factions to control the large food aid that the country was 
receiving.  
 
As we have shown above, the economics literature has documented several mechanisms that can 
explain why sudden windfalls of resources in developing countries could lead to a decline in their 
growth rate. But, it can also affect the level of democracy and institutional development. The 
appropriation of foreign aid and the rent seeking behavior associated with it requires weak 
institutions. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that foreign aid has some impact on institutions. 
Brautigam and Knack (2004) have recently summarized some mechanisms that could explain a 
  5negative relationship between foreign aid and democracy.  “High levels of aid can make it more 
difficult to solve the collective action problems that are inherent in reform efforts, create moral 
hazards for both recipients and donors, perpetuate both a “soft budget constraint” and a “tragedy of 
the commons” with regards to the future budget, and weaken the development of local pressures for 
accountability and reform”. Therefore, a large amount of aid can reduce the incentives for 
democratic accountability. When revenues do not depend on the taxes raised from citizens and 
business, there is less incentive for accountability. At the same time corrupt government officials 
will try to perpetuate their rent seeking activities by reducing the likelihood of losing power.   
 
3. Some Empirical Evidence 
 
Traditionally the literature that analyzes the effect of foreign aid on development has used official 
development assistance (ODA) data. ODA measures aid flows that arrive to the recipient country in 
a given year, irrespective of what part, if any, has to be repaid. Data are in current US dollars.
4 
Following Burnside and Dollar (2000) we use the IMF's Import Unit Value index to transform data 
in constant dollars and to purchasing power parity.
5 Table 1 shows the twenty most aid dependent 
countries in the world. The numbers indicate the average share of aid to GDP over the 1970 – 1999 
period. Comoros received around 16%, Guinea-Bissau near 14%, and Mauritania more than 12%. 
None of these countries have oil resources.  
 
The share of primary exports over GDP is the variable most widely used as a proxy for natural 
resource dependence. But the data are missing in many developing countries, especially during 
years of civil conflict.  Additionally, among all natural resources, oil is the one that provide largest 
rents, specially, after 1973. For these reason we consider only rents from oil and not rents from all 
                                                 
4 Whether aid should be adjusted for purchasing power parity depends on whether the funds are spent on 
tradable or non-tradable goods. In practice donor money is spent on both so there is equal justification for 
adjusting or not adjusting. We use PPP-adjusted aid but find that our results are robust to the use of non-
adjusted aid.  
5 The Unit Value Import index (UVI) is the ratio between the Import Unit values and import prices. In order 
to have the aid data in constant dollars and in purchasing power parity we multiply by the Unit Value Import 
Index of 1985 for the world and then divide by the UVI index for the world of the current year. Finally, we 
divide the aid value by real GDP in constant 1985 prices using the Penn World Tables 5.6. 
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6. This is very important because as aid, rents from oil are a new phenomenon after 
1960 and 1973 respectively. The fact that countries are not dependent from aid and oil rents before 
1960 is very convenient, especially if we are interested in knowing how the windfall of resources 
from oil and aid affect institutional development. An alternative measure of rents from oil is the 
barrel production per day and the price per barrel, available from British Petroleum. Prices are in 
current dollars and are converted into constant dollars using the IMF's Import Unit Value index, as 
in the case of aid. Table 1 shows the twenty most oil-revenue dependent countries in the world. 
Kuwait tops the list. During 1973-1999, the rents from oil in Kuwait represent 49% of GDP. Saudi 
Arabia (48%) and Gabon (44%) are close behind. Oil producers seldom receive aid.  
 
There are two basic sources of data on political institutions. The first source of information is the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) constructed by Keefer et al. (2001), which provides 
information after 1975. The variable CHECKS captures the number of decision makers whose 
agreement is necessary before policies can be changed (checks and balances).
7 The construction of 
the variable is based on legislative and executive indices of electoral competitiveness and the 
number of the parties in the government coalition. Countries with multiple decision makers offer 
greater protection of individuals from arbitrary government actions. The lower is the value of 
checks and balances, the higher is the level of political exclusion. It takes values from 1 to 9 in our 
sample, 1 being countries with the lowest number of key decision makers. For example in 1999 
Liberia, Nigeria, Haiti and Honduras scored 1 or 2 in CHECKS.  Madagascar, Kenya, Cameroon, 
and Sierra Leone had a score of 3, and Ecuador, Nepal, Thailand 4 or 5. We alternatively use the 
measures of legislative and executive electoral competitiveness, also in DPI, and find that 
quantitatively similar results (not reported) are obtained when using these variables.  
 
Another source of information on political institutions is the Polity IV project. It constructs scales 
of democracy (DEMOC) through the aggregation of authority characteristics, the procedure for 
                                                 
6 The rents of oil are more than three times the value of the rents from exports of other natural resources like 
ore and metals. For this calculation we use the data on rents from primary commodities export of the World 
Bank. 
7 Another relevant set of variables on judicial checks and balances are developed in La Porta et al. (2004). 
Unfortunately, their 71-country sample covers less than half of the countries in our sample.  
  7recruitment of chief executives, and the centralization of government structure.
8 The variable 
DEMOC ranges from 0 to 10. For example in 1999, Sudan, China and Uganda were countries with 
0 level of democracy, while Malaysia was coded with an intermediate level of 4. Uruguay and 
Mauritius are examples of full democracy, scoring at 10. Several examples help explain its 
construction. In Fiji, a 1987 military coup led by Stivenu Rabuka installed a government ruled by 
indigenous Melanesians. The democracy score dropped from 9 to 0. In Niger, a 1996 coup led by 
Colonel Mainassara ousted the elected government. The democracy score dropped from 8 to 0. In 
Thailand, student protests in 1992 forced the military to call depoliticize and call elections. 
Thailand’s democracy score went from 1 to 8. In Indonesia, the authoritarian regime of General 
Suharto collapsed in 1998 and new elections were called the following year. Indonesia’s democracy 
score jumped from 0 to 8.  
 
The two variables previously discussed (CHECKS and DEMOC) are linked. Countries that become 
more democratic tend to display an increase in checks and balances on the government and have a 
more decentralized structure. In fact, we could consider CHECKS and DEMOC as two alternative 
proxies of the level of democracy
9.  
 
We have a sample of 108 recipient countries. Among them 43 are sub-Saharan African countries, 
29 from Latin America, and 13 from Asia. With these data in hand, we analyze what happens in the 
countries that receive the largest amount of aid. Table 2 ranks the 10 countries that receive the 
largest and least amount of aid conditional on having any institutional change during that 5-years 
period. On average, aid-dependent countries suffer a 2 points reduction in democracy. In contrast, 
the countries least dependent on aid suffer a 0.9 points reduction in democracy. These results 
suggest a positive correlation between aid and reduction in the democratic level of countries. 
   
African countries are the largest recipients of foreign aid. In addition they are among the least 
democratic. Therefore it seems reasonable to look at the time series behavior of foreign aid and the 
level of democracy among these countries. Figure 1 shows a negative relationship between the 
annual average of aid over GDP and the level of democracy during the 60’s until the end of the 80. 
                                                 
8 Freedom House also has a democracy variable. It is cruder, yet the correlation between the Polity and 
Freedom House variables during our sample period is 0.88. 
9 The correlation between these two variables is 0.76. 
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place on that period, which was accompanied by a reduction in the average level of aid over GDP. 
This result is robust to calculating the average weighted by population. Figure 2 shows the same 
relationship but for all the recipients countries, not only the ones in Africa. The relationship 
between the annual average aid over GDP and the level of democracy follows the same pattern.  
 
 
4. Estimation 
 
The descriptive statistics in the previous section indicate a negative correlation between the 
changes in the stock of foreign aid and changes in political institutions. Next, we investigate 
econometrically whether changes in the stock of foreign aid and rents from oil have an effect on 
changes in political institutions. In the empirical analysis we use a sample of recipient countries and 
data of two different periods: 1977 to 1999 when using the DPI database, and 1960 to 1999, when 
using the Polity IV database. 
 
We consider several explanatory variables besides foreign aid and oil. Sudden changes in the terms 
of trade are shocks that can lead to social unrest and political instability. This effect is related to the 
reduced ability of corrupt governments to benefit from exports of natural resources.  Negative 
shocks pressure governments to reduce democracy and checks and balances in order to increase 
their capture of resources. On the other hand positive shocks imply an increase in the size of rents 
that can be appropriated. Finally, we control for the initial quality of political institutions. Table 3 
describes the main variables used in the analysis.
10  
 
As aid may flow to countries whose institutions are getting worse, we need instruments for foreign 
aid. We follow Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly et al. (2004) and use the logarithm of 
initial income, the logarithm of population and a group of variables that the literature labels as 
“donors’ strategic interests” – represented by dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa, the Franc 
Zone, Egypt, and Central American countries
11. All those instruments are standard in the study of 
                                                 
10 Knack (2001) analyzes the effect of aid on the change on the ICRG index, but using a different specification.  
11 Notice that these variables are essentially regional dummy variables. 
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instruments in the case of the effect of aid on the change in institutions are different. However, it is 
reasonable to maintain the hypothesis that the strategic interest variables affect the change in 
institutions only through their impact on foreign aid
12. In the case of income and population the 
exclusion restriction could be more problematic, although these variables have been extensively 
used as instruments in the literature
13. Section 6 presents a lengthy discussion of alternative 
instrumentation strategies and shows that the choice of this particular set of instruments is not 
decisive for the results. 
Following the theoretical arguments exposed above, our basic specification is the following: 
) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 4 3 2 1 0 it t it it it it it it INST SHOCKS SHOCKS OIL aid INST ε λ δ β β β β β + + + + + − + + + = ∆ −
 
) 2 ( ' 1 1 it z i it p it y it z p y aid ζ γ φ γ + + + = − −  
where   is the change on institutions, aid  is a measure of the change in the stock of aid 
received by a country measured as the net ODA (flow) over GDP,   is the size of rents of oil 
over GDP, SHOCKS(.) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of trade 
and INST is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period
it INST ∆
OIL
14. The excluded 
instruments are logarithm of initial income (y), the logarithm of population in the initial period (p) 
and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests” (z).  In the following section on 
the robustness of the results, we check the sensitivity of the basic results to the inclusion of the 
additional variables proposed in the empirical literature on democratization. As we will see, most of 
these potential additional variables turn out not to be statistically significant in the specification in 
first differences, which is consistent with results found by many other researchers. 
 
Knack (2004) and Bräutigam and Knack (2004) have also recently studied the determinants of 
changes in institutions and the quality of democracy. Our study is different in many respects. First, 
these studies consider a different sample period from ours. Knack (2004) considers a cross section 
                                                 
12 This is the basic assumption that justify the use of other instruments for aid that have been proposed recently in the 
literature, like arms imports or the predicted aid based on the characteristics of the donor countries. Section 6 discusses 
these alternative instruments. 
13 The WP version of this paper presents a long discussion on the appropriateness of these instruments from a statistical 
viewpoint with many tests and empirical strategies to justify their usefulness.  
14 The specification can be interpreted as regressing changes on changes. Aid is the net change in the stock of foreign 
aid over GDP; Oil is the annual rents from oil over GDP and the shocks are, by definition, changes in the levels.   
  10of changes of the Freedom House index from 1975 to 2000. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) work 
with a cross section of African countries from 1982 to 1997. By contrast, our basic result is 
obtained from a panel of 5 years periods instead of a single cross-section. Second, we only include 
in the specification sources of a sudden windfall of resources (aid, oil and shocks to the terms of 
trade) that may generate an institutional change in order to increase the chances of the groups in 
power to control these resources. Knack (2004) includes aid together with income and other 
indicators of the level of development of a country (for instance illiteracy).  These variables are 
included in levels and first differences but turn out to be not significantly different from 0.
15  By 
contrast, Knack (2004) does not include rents of oil as an explanatory variable. We use ODA from 
the OECD and we transform it into constant dollars and PPP, following Burnside and Dollar, and 
we do the ratio over real GDP in constant 1985 prices using Penn World Tables. Knack (2004) uses 
aid over GNP from the World Development Indicators
16. Moreover, we compare the effect of ODA 
with the effect of rents from oil using the production and price information from British petroleum. 
Finally, our instrumentation strategy is different from the one presented in Knack (2004). 
 
We first estimate the effect of aid on political institutions using the variable checks and balances. 
The column 1 in table 4a presents the OLS estimation
17. The effect of aid on democracy is 
significant although, given our previous comment, this estimator is likely to be biased. The results 
of the IV estimation
18 appear in column 2. Table 4b contains the results of the first stage of the 
estimation. As expected, the initial income has a negative effect on the change in ODA received by 
a country. On the contrary, the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy has a positive effect. The F test for 
excluded instruments is large (F(6,341)=41.57) and above usual thresholds which implies that the 
instruments are relevant. Notice that it is quite likely that there is intra-group correlation. Under this 
circumstance IV estimators are still consistent but the usual standard deviation will not be 
consistent.  For this reason in column 2 we present the z-statistics obtained using a cluster-robust 
standard deviation. The results show that foreign aid has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the changes of the checks and balances stance of a country.  The coefficient on the past 
                                                 
15 If we include income per capita as an additional regressor it is insignificantly different from 0 as in Knack (2004). 
16 The correlation across these different variables is high. For instance, our aid over GDP variable has a correlation of 
0.85 with the ratio of aid over GDP (both in current dollars).  
17 All the specifications include time dummies. 
18 The IV estimation and diagnostic tests have been obtained using the routine ivreg2 written by Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman (2003). 
  11level of checks is negative and significantly different from 0. Finally Sargan’s test shows that the 
overidentification restrictions cannot be rejected even at levels well above the conventional level. 
 
Column 2 in table 4a indicates that the more aid a country received the worse its political 
institutions get. If the average amount of aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five 
years reaches the 75
th percentile, then the index of democracy is reduced by close to half a point 
(0.41). By contrast, if aid over GDP reaches the 25
th percentile then the reduction in the index of 
democracy is a modest 0.04 points. Countries in the 75
th percentile are, for example, Bolivia, Chad, 
Senegal, Central African Republic and Haiti. Countries in the 25
th percentile are, for example, 
Chile, Turkey, Ecuador and Malaysia. The effect of oil revenues is not significant.  
 
However, IV estimators under heteroskedasticity may not be efficient. For this reason column 3 
presents the results of the estimation using the generalized method of moments (GMM). The 
estimator for aid is similar to the one shown in column 2: foreign aid has a negative and significant 
coefficient. The J test cannot reject the overidentifying moment conditions generated by the 
instruments. We can also calculate a GMM estimator assuming the presence of arbitrary intra-
cluster correlation (column 4). The results are also similar to the ones reported in column 2. In 
addition the J test confirms that the instruments pass the test of over-identification.   
 
To check the robustness of the findings with five-year periods, table 5 presents the results of 
different estimation procedures using a cross section of countries for the period 1977-99 (long 
differences). We present the estimation using OLS, ordered probit and IV estimators. As in 
previous tables, foreign aid, and the initial level of democracy have a negative and significant 
coefficient.  
The effect of aid over GDP in the long run is large: if a country received the average amount of aid 
over GDP over the period 1977-1999, then the recipient country would have gone from the average 
level of democracy in the initial year to a total absence of democratic institutions. The effect of oil 
in the long-run is not significant.    
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5. Robustness of the results. 
 
This section presents a large set of robustness checks of the main results using additional 
explanatory variables for democratization, alternative variables to represents institutions, different 
estimation procedures, alternative samples of countries and the elimination of outliers. These 
robustness tests are designed to check if the results discussed before are altered by reasonable 
changes in the specification or the use of other proxy for institutional development. 
 
5.1. Using additional explanatory variables 
 
In this section we introduce a discussion of the democratization literature and its implications on 
the specification proposed in section 4. We show that our results are robust to the inclusion of other 
potential determinants of democratization that are still under discussion in this literature. The 
starting point of the paper was to investigate whether a sudden windfall of resources, mainly from 
foreign aid and rents of oil, has any effect on the institutional development of aid-recipient 
countries. The literature on democratization has proposed some variables that could help to explain 
the democratic stance of a country. We are going to analyze initially the covariates included by 
Barro (1999), and discussed by later papers
19. Table 6 presents the results of these regressions. 
The first candidate is education. There is a recent debate on whether democracy needs education. 
We do not enter into this debate since our purpose is not to analyze whether more educated 
countries end up with high levels of democracy, but to investigate whether countries where the 
level of education increases experience any democratization process. Barro (1999), using a SUR 
estimator, finds that the years of primary education have a positive effect on the level of democracy 
but upper schooling have no effect. Papaioannou and Sirounis (2004) investigate the economic and 
social factors driving the third wave of democratization. While they find that education is important 
to consolidate democracies, as Glaeser et al (2004), it turns to be insignificant to explain 
democratic transitions
20. Acemoglu et al. (2007) find that education has no explanatory power for 
                                                 
19 In order to make the results comparable we include as explanatory variable the dummy for oil countries (as in Barro 
1999) instead of the rents of oil. 
20 This is the analysis that is closer to ours in the sense that we investigate the determinants of changes in democracy in 
countries in democratic transition. 
  13democracy in a specification with lagged democracy as explanatory variable.  We also find that the 
change in education does not have a significant effect on institutional changes (Table 6, column 2). 
The third column of table 6 analyzes the effect of including two variables considered in Barro 
(1999) and used by Acemoglu et al (2007): years of primary education and the gap between male 
and female primary schooling. The coefficient estimate for aid is still negative, while the new 
explanatory variables are not statistically significant.   
Barro (1999) also includes the urbanization rate as an additional regressor. In his regressions this 
variable does not have a significant effect, which is also the case in column 4 of our table 6. 
Finally, Barro (1999) finds that the level of GDP has a positive effect on the indices of electoral 
rights and civil liberties. Papaioannou and Sirounis (2004) reach a different result using the 
specification in differences: changes in income levels are not significant to explain democratic 
transitions. The latest result is supported by Acemoglu et al. (2007)
21. In line with these recent 
results we also find that economic growth has no significant effect in explaining changes in 
democracy. It is important to notice that the effect of ODA is robust to the inclusion of economic 
growth and the parameter estimate is very similar in all the regressions. Our results are also robust 
to the inclusion of other regressors that do not change over time like the legal origin, latitude and 
religious fragmentation (Papaioannou and Sirounis 2004)
22.  
The sensitivity analysis included in this section indicates that our specification seems to capture the 
basic determinants of the changes on democracy, and that our results are robust to the inclusion of 
many different variables that could have a potential effect on democratization. In line with 
Papaioannou and Sirounis (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2007), most of the potential explanatory 
variables for democratization seem to be insignificant when using the specification in differences.  
It seems that flows of ODA and natural resources, together with shocks in the terms of trade, and 
the initial level of democracy, capture reasonably well the basic determinants of changes in 
democracy.  For this reason, we are going to keep the basic specification in the following sections, 
and check the sensitivity of the results to alternative institutional variables, estimation procedures, 
sample of countries and the elimination of outliers.  
 
 
                                                 
21 We included a lengthy discussion on the role of GDP as an excluded instrument in the working paper version of this 
article. 
22 Results are available under request. 
  145.2. Using alternative institutional variables 
 
We start by checking the sensitivity of the results to an alternative measure of institutional 
development. We perform the analysis of the section 4 but using the proxy for democracy from 
Polity IV instead of checks and balances. We consider the estimation using the 5-years period 
(Table 7) and the cross-section of countries (Table 8). In column 1 of table 7 we present the results 
using OLS. It shows a negative and marginally significant negative effect of foreign aid on the 
change in the democratic stance of the countries. The second column presents the instrumental 
variables estimation. The F test for excluded instruments is large (F(6, 442)=65.91)) which 
indicates that the relevance of the instruments is statistically acceptable. As explained before it is 
likely that there is intra-group correlation, therefore we present the z-statistics obtained using 
cluster-robust standard deviation. The results show that foreign aid has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the changes on the level of democracy of a country. The effect of rents of oil is 
also negative and statistically significant. As in section 4, the initial level of institutional 
development, in this case the level of democracy measure by the indicator in POLITY IV, is 
negative and significantly different from zero.  Sargan’s test of over-identification cannot reject the 
orthogonality conditions at the conventional levels of significance.  
 
Given that the previous IV results will not be efficient under heteroskedasticity, we present the 
GMM estimator in column 3 of table 7. The results are similar: flows of aid have a negative and 
significant effect of the changes on democracy. However, in this regression, the rents of oil are 
statistically insignificant. The J test of over-identification cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions at least at the conventional level.  In column 4 we 
present the results of the GMM estimations assuming the presence of arbitrary intra-cluster 
correlation. The results again are similar, and the J test of over-identification leads to a p-value 
around 0.2 which is above the conventional level.  
 
Table 8 presents the results using a cross-section of countries for the period 1960-99. It shows the 
results of the OLS, ordered probit and the IV specification. As before, flows of foreign aid have a 
negative and significant effect on the change on the proxy for institutions coming from Polity IV. 
Rents of oil have also a negative effect on democracy. The sample from 1960 to 1999 is small 
  15because there are many countries for which there is no information on Polity IV for 1960. For this 
reason we also include the cross section that covers the period 1975-99. In this case we can work 
with 79 observations. The basic results are unaffected by the period or the estimation procedure 
used
23. However, notice that the size of the coefficient in the cross-section regression is somehow 
larger than the coefficient obtained using the panel data structure because the impact is supposed to 
represent the full temporal extension instead of just five years.    
             
5.3. Panel data estimation with lagged dependent variable 
 
Since changes of institutions are regressed on lagged institutions, the estimation using the panel of 
countries but without considering the correlation between a possible country specific effect and the 
lagged endogenous variable will be inconsistent. Therefore, in this section we consider the 
specification 
) 3 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 4 3 2 1 0 it i t it it it it it it INST SHOCKS SHOCKS OIL aid INST ε µ λ δ β β β β β + + + + + + + − + + + = −
 
This is basically equation (1) but introducing country specific effects. In order to accommodate the 
standard formulation of the specification we consider the regression of the level of institutional 
development on the past level. Obviously, the interpretation of the parameter of the lagged 
institutional variable is different from the previous section. 
In order to address this issue we use the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond  
(1998)
24.  The system GMM estimator uses the orthogonality conditions implied by the Arellano 
and Bond estimator, but including also additional orthogonality conditions derived from the panel 
data lagged dependent variable specification
25. Recently, Acemoglu et al (2005) have used the 
Arellano and Bond estimator to show that education is not a significant explanatory variable for 
democracy. This finding has been challenged by Bobba and Coviello (2007) using the additional 
orthogonality conditions proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The system GMM estimation includes the orthogonality conditions of the first-differenced GMM 
estimator plus some extra moments, which depend on restrictions on the initial conditions 
                                                 
23 Notice that using IV we have fewer observations because for some countries we do not have some of the instruments. 
 
24 We use this estimator following the suggestion of one referee. The working paper version of the paper presents the 
estimation using the standard Arellano-Bond estimator with level instruments for the difference specification. 
25 In particular, it includes as additional moment conditions the level equation with instruments in first differences. 
  16generating the dependent variable. In particular, they imply that the system is stationary and that 
temporary deviations from the steady state value are uncorrelated with the fixed effects
26.  
Table 9 present the results of the system GMM estimation
27. We consider ODA and the initial level 
of checks and balances as potentially endogenous variables. Table 9 reports the second stage 
estimator and the standard error between parentheses. It is well-know that the Arellano and Bond 
two-stage procedure, as most of the two-stage GMM estimators, generates estimates of the standard 
deviation which are biased. For this reason we report the estimated standard deviation using the 
Windmeijer (2005) correction.  
In column 1 we include the instruments considered in the previous section together with the 
instruments generated by the system GMM procedure. The results show that flows of aid have a 
negative and significant effect on the institutional development of recipient countries. The rents of 
oil have also a statistically significant negative effect. The coefficients estimated are almost 
identical to the ones presented in Table 7. The coefficient of initial democracy is also very similar 
to the one derived from the transformation of the coefficient of lagged democracy in Table 7.  The 
specification passes the usual Hansen test, indicating that the overidentifying orthogonality 
conditions are not rejected. Table 9 reports also several difference-in-Hansen tests for subsets of 
instruments. The first row presents the test for the subset of instruments of the moment conditions 
based on the level equations generated by the procedure (without considering in this set the 
exogenous variables). The test cannot reject the null hypothesis. The test for the set of exogenous 
variables and for the set of orthogonality conditions generated by the difference endogenous 
variables cannot reject either the appropriateness of those instruments.  
However, in the system GMM estimator the number of orthogonality conditions grow fast with the 
number of periods and lags available. Roodman (2007b) notices that if there are many instruments 
but the sample size is small, then there may be a downward bias in the two-step standard error and 
the Hansen test becomes a weak indicator of the validity of the model.  Calderon et al. (2002) and 
Beck and Levine (2004) consider a reduction in the instrument set based on using only one 
instrument for each lag distance and instrumenting variable. This approach implies collapsing the 
instruments in the terminology of Roodman (2007b)
 28. The standard instruments for the differences 
                                                 
26 Although this is not the only possible scenario for the satisfaction of those extra moment conditions. 
27 We use the routine XTABOND2 written by Roodman. 
28 See Roodman (2007b) for a discussion on techniques to reduce the number of instruments when working with the 
system GMM estimator. 
  17equations includes a separate instrument for each time period. The matrix of instruments Z 
corresponding to the endogeneous variable and the third difference, and above,  
2 ; 3 0 ) ( , ≥ ≥ ∨ = ∆ − s t y E it s t i ε  
has the form
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We could collapse the instruments to get the following matrix of instruments
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The estimation of column 1 in Table 9 implies 70 moment conditions. This is not a particularly 
large number considering that we have 456 observations. Nevertheless, we have estimated the 
specification collapsing the moment conditions as explained above. Column 2 of table 9 presents 
the results. The main result is unchanged: foreign aid has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on democracy. The number of instruments has been reduced to 30. All the Hansen tests are 
satisfactory. The J-test cannot reject the validity of the overidentifying moment restrictions. The 
moment conditions generated by the level equation, the differences equation and the exogenous 
variables are not rejected by the data.  
The results using our preferred proxy for institutional development are reassuring. Columns 3 of 
table 9 present the same estimations as columns 1 but using the index of checks and balances as 
proxy for institutions. In this case, since there are data for fewer time periods than for the previous 
proxy, the number of instruments is low (41) even without collapsing the matrices of instruments. 
The coefficient estimated for ODA is quite similar to the one reported in table 4a. In this case, the 
rents of oil do not have a statistically significant effect on checks and balances. The Hansen test is 
well above the conventional level. The difference in Hansen test for the instruments of the level 
equations (excluding the exogenous variables) cannot reject those overidentifying restrictions. The 
                                                 
29 Without considering the rows of 0’s on top of the matrix. 
30 The moment conditions associated with the equation in levels can also be collapsed in a single column. 
  18second difference in Hansen test shows that the moment conditions generated by the exogenous 
variables are not rejected by the data. Finally, the difference-in-Hansen test for the difference 
equations cannot reject the validity of those moment conditions.  
 
5.4. Sensitivity of the results to the sample of countries and the elimination of outliers. 
 
Table 10 tests the sensitivity of the results when we reduce the sample of countries to the ones that 
have had a change in the level of democracy
31.  We perform the same analysis but considering only 
the countries, years and periods in which institutions changed. The rows indicate the frequency of 
the data (5-year panels or cross-section). In the cross-section, we include different starting years, 
1960, 1965, 1970, and 1975. We use IV and standard errors corrected by clusters. The columns 
indicate which institutional variable is used as the dependent variable. The numbers of the table are 
the coefficient of foreign aid and the t-statistic. The results indicate that institutional development 
worsens with increased aid flows
32.  In fact, the size of the parameters is higher than in the basic 
specification, which was expected since we are only considering the sample with actual changes in 
the degree of democratization. 
We also check whether results may be caused by countries scoring below the median on democracy 
at the beginning of the period. For that purpose we run the regressions for countries scoring above 
the median on democracy, and we find qualitatively the same results. This indicates that countries 
with good democratic institutions are not immune to the “curse of aid”
33. 
Finally, we consider the effect of eliminating the outliers on the results of the estimation. Following 
Roodman (2007) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), outliers are chosen by applying the 
Hadi (1992) procedure, using 0.05 as the cut-off significant level. Table 11 presents the results of 
different estimation procedure in the cross section sample once the outliers are eliminated. Columns 
1 and 2 consider the OLS estimator for the cross section of countries during the full period. Figure 
3 shows the partial correlation between change in institutions (checks and balances) and aid 
obtained using the OLS regressions in column 1. Figure 4 corresponds to the partial correlation 
                                                 
31 Therefore, we do not include in the sample the observations when the change in democracy in the period is 0. This 
exercise was suggested by one of the referees. 
32 We only include one cross section in the case of changes in checks and balances since the temporal extension of the 
endogenous variable is shorter than the one for changes in democracy. 
33 Results are available upon request. 
  19between change in the democracy proxy in POLITY IV and foreign aid once the outliers (Jordan 
and Mauritania) have been eliminated. The slope of this relationship continues being negative.  
Neither the OLS estimators nor the ones in the following columns (IV and GMM estimators) imply 
any qualitative change of the basic findings: foreign aid has a negative and significant effect on the 
democratic stance of the aid-receiving countries.    
 
 
 
6. Alternative instruments. 
 
Previous sections have shown the results of the estimation using the standard instruments for 
foreign aid. In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis in which we investigate whether the 
results are robust to the use of alternative instrumentation strategies. When we use the standard 
instrumentation for foreign aid the results of the tests indicate that the orthogonality conditions 
generated by these instruments are not rejected. However, overidentification tests may have low 
power if there are too many instruments. In section 5.3 we already discussed the robustness of the 
estimation to the instruments generated by the orthogonality conditions associated with the 
Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator. In this section we propose new identification strategies that 
use still another set of instruments.  
Our first approach to address the problems of endogeneity between foreign aid and changes of 
political institutions was to use the set of standard instruments proposed by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) and used in Easterly et al. (2004), Hansen and Trap (2004) and Clemens et al. (2004). Those 
instruments include the logarithm of initial income, the logarithm of population and a group of 
variables that captures donors “strategic interests” – represented by dummy variables for Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Franc Zone, Egypt, and Central American countries. Even though the 
overidentification tests indicate that the orthogonality constrains generated by these instruments are 
not statistically rejected we check the robustness of the results using an alternative instrumentation 
strategy. Initially, we substitute the regional variables (strategic interest variables) by a colonization 
variable.  It is reasonable to think that countries that have been a colony might receive more foreign 
aid from their old colonizers, than countries that have never been under any European power. We 
construct a dummy that has value 1 if the recipient country has ever been a colony, and zero 
  20otherwise. Therefore, in column 1 of table 12 we use as instruments the logarithm of initial income, 
the logarithm of population and the dummy of ex-colony.  We follow the basic estimation 
procedures described in section 4.  In table 12 we reproduce the estimation of column 2 of table 4a 
with the new set of instruments. That is, we perform the IV estimation, and the z-statistics obtained 
using a cluster-robust standard deviation. The F-test of excluded instruments is quite high (F= 
32.27). The Sargan’s test is well above conventional levels. The results corroborate that foreign aid 
has a negative and significant effect on the changes of political institutions of a country.  
In column 2 we check weather the sub-Saharan African dummy is driving the identification. 
Therefore, we drop this dummy from the set of instruments. The instruments included are therefore 
the logarithm of initial income, the logarithm of population and the dummies for strategic interest 
excluding the dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries. The F of excluded instruments (27.66) 
points towards the relevance of the instruments. The results are similar to the ones obtained in table 
4a, where aid has a negative and statistically significant effect on the change on political 
institutions.     
In column 3 we add a measure of arms imports relative to total imports lagged one period, a 
variable that has been used as instrument for aid in other papers in the literature of aid and growth 
as Hansen and Tarp (2002), Clemens at al. (2004), and also Burnside and Dollar (2000). Rajan and 
Subramanian (2007a) argue that “the variable arms imports could be a proxy for strategic reasons 
for giving aid, and thus is plausibly orthogonal to motives for giving aid that relates to the 
underlying economic situation of the recipient country” (Pag 12). A similar argument applies for 
the case of the underlying democratic situation of the recipient country.  The F-test for the excluded 
instruments is high (F=23.86). The p-value for the Sargan test is clearly above any conventional 
level of significance, and the results support the conclusions we obtained using the basic 
specification: foreign aid has a negative and statistically significant effect on the change in political 
institutions. The parameter estimate is just marginally larger than the one obtained in the basic 
regressions.  
In columns 4, 5 and 6 we drop some instruments to show that results are robust to the exclusion of 
some potentially controversial instruments such as the logarithm of initial income and the logarithm 
of population. In column 4 we drop the logarithm of initial income from the set of instruments, 
leaving the logarithm of population, strategic interests and arms imports as instruments. In column 
5 we drop the logarithm of initial income and the logarithm of population from the set of 
  21instruments leaving arms imports and strategic interests as instruments. Therefore, in this exercise 
we only consider variables that proxy for strategic reasons for giving aid, which are very likely to 
be orthogonal to the underlying factors affecting institutional development in aid-receiving 
countries. In both columns, 4 and 5, the F of excluded instruments is high (19.97 and 14.04 
respectively), and the Sargan’s test indicates that the overidentifying orthogonality conditions 
generated by the instruments are not rejected by the data at the conventional level of significance. 
In both cases the results indicate that foreign aid has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
the change in political institutions with a coefficient very similar to the one in the basic table 4a. 
Finally, in column 6 we consider the strictest list of instruments: only the strategic interest 
variables. The Sargan test is again well above the conventional levels of significance. Foreign aid 
continues having a negative and significant coefficient on the change in institutions.  
We also consider the robustness of our results to the use of the instruments proposed by Rajan and 
Subramanian (2007a, 2007b) based on bilateral aid flows and donors’ characteristics. Their 
instrumentation strategy is based on a clever idea, which is to model the supply of aid based on 
donor-related rather than recipient-specific characteristics. They base their instrumentation strategy 
on “considerations that drive individual donors to give aid to a country other than those related to a 
country’s level of income or growth. So the construction of the instruments starts from the bilateral 
(donor-recipient) relationship and aggregates up. This is in contrast to the literature that picks 
instruments directly at the level of the recipient country” (Pg. 14). The construction of the 
instrument is based on two assumptions: the first assumption is that the greater the extent of historic 
relationships between a donor and a recipient the more likely that a donor will want to give aid. 
They capture this idea through colonial links and common language. The second assumption is that 
donors are more likely to want to give aid the more they expect to have influence over recipient. 
They proxy this influence, with the relative size of donor and recipient. They also include the 
interaction between relative size and colonial links
34. In table 12, columns 7 and 8, we consider the 
basic specification using as instrument for aid the one proposed by Rajan and Subramanian (2007a, 
2007b)
35. For that reason we use a cross-section specification to adapt the estimation to the 
availability of the instrument. The instrument is available for the periods 1960-2000, 1970-2000, 
1980-2000 and 1990-2000. Since we have data on political institution from 1977, we perform two 
                                                 
34 See Rajan and Subramanian (2007a) for details of the instrumentation process 
35 We thank Rajan and Subramanian for sharing their instrument with us. 
  22cross-section analyses: for the period 1980-2000 and the period 1990-2000. The F of excluded 
instruments is above the usual threshold (F=10.24). The result in columns 7 and 8 shows that 
foreign aid has a negative and statistically significant effect on the change on political institutions. 
The magnitude of the coefficient on foreign aid is higher than the one found in table 5. However, 
we should notice that in the cross-section estimation of Table 12 the sample is different from the 
one in Table 5: the instrument is not available for some countries and the sample period is also 
different.  
In summary, table 12 shows that the basic results are robust to the use of many alternative 
instrumentation strategies. In particular, eliminating some of the most controversial instruments 
used in the previous literature (like the log of per capita income) does not affect the results. More 
importantly, the basic results are robust to using only the variables that are driven by the interest of 
the donors (strategic interest) and are plausibly uncorrelated with the underlying factors that affect 
institutional development in aid-receiving countries. Finally, there are two very reassuring facts 
about these regressions: the size of the coefficient on foreign aid is basically unchanged no matter 
what set of instruments is used for the estimation; and the Sargan-Hansen tests are well above the 
conventional significance levels.  The results of table 12 are basically unchanged if we run the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator or the system estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998)
36. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Recently a United Nations proposal for a doubling in foreign aid in order to generate a “big push” 
in development has been put forward (UN, 2005). The results described in the previous literature 
suggest that more money will likely generate little growth. Instead, stronger incentives for rent 
seeking may reduce the quality of democratic institutions and the checks and balances in the 
governments of recipient countries.  
 
                                                 
36 Results are available upon request. We have also performed the same robustness analysis using the definition of 
democracy from Polity IV finding very similar results.  
  23Using data on over one hundred countries and for over forty years, this study quantifies the effects 
of aid on democracy. Being dependent on foreign aid seems to result in worsening democratic 
institutions. This effect is akin to the “curse of oil” effect established in previous work. We provide 
new evidence for the relative size of the curse of aid and the curse of oil on political institutions. 
The comparison is instructive as it highlights how little is known about the delivery of foreign aid, 
despite an estimated $2.3 trillion spent on aid in the second half of the 20
th century. The specific 
mechanism why foreign aid has a negative effect on political institutions needs to be further 
investigated.  
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Figure 2:  Tracking Aid and Democracy in the world 
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  Figure 3: Partial Correlation of Aid and change in political institutions (checks and balances) 
Sample without outliers. 
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Figure 4: Partial Correlation of Aid and change in institutions (democracy) 
Sample without outliers. 
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Table 1: The 20 most aid or oil-dependent countries 
 
Country  Aid over GDP  Country  Oil revenue over GDP 
Comoros 
Guinea-Bissau 
Mauritania 
Chad 
Gambia, The 
Zambia 
Central Afr. Rep. 
Mali 
Somalia 
Jordan 
Niger 
Burkina Faso 
Malawi 
Lesotho 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Nicaragua 
Senegal 
Burundi 
Rwanda 
16.1 
13.9 
12.3 
8.1 
8.1 
8.0 
7.2 
7.1 
7.0 
7.0 
6.2 
6.2 
6.1 
6.1 
5.9 
5.9 
5.8 
5.3 
5.2 
5.1 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
Gabon 
Angola 
Oman 
Iraq 
Congo, Rep. 
Algeria 
Venezuela 
Nigeria 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Ecuador 
Papua New Guinea 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Cameroon 
Mexico 
Syrian Arab Rep.  
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
49.5 
48.2 
44.6 
38.5 
35.6 
22.6 
19.5 
15.5 
14.4 
12.9 
12.2 
11.5 
7.1 
7.1 
6.2 
6.1 
4.4 
4.4 
4.4 
4.2 
Note: ODA over GDP is the average annual share of GDP during 1970-1999. Oil revenue over GDP is the 
average annual share of GDP during 1973-1999. 
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Table 2: Top and Bottom 10 Recipients of Aid and Changes in Institutions 
 
 
Country Oda  Democracy  lag  ∆Democ 
Zambia, 1996  29.52  6  -3 
Comoros, 1999  14.30  5  -4 
Gambia, The, 1990  11.99  7  1 
Nicaragua, 1995  10.33  6  2 
Gambia, The, 1994  9.34  8  -8 
Lesotho, 1970  9.04  9  -9 
Botswana, 1971  8.89  7  2 
Madagascar, 1998  8.84  8  -1 
Jordan, 1992  8.05  1  1 
Mali, 1997  7.78  7  -1 
     
Venezuela, 1992  0.017  9  -1 
Venezuela, 1999  0.025  8  -1 
Argentina, 1976  0.025  6  -6 
Brazil, 1985  0.031  2  5 
Argentina, 1999  0.032  7  1 
Mexico, 1988  0.034  1  1 
Mexico, 1997  0.041  4  2 
Brazil, 1988  0.043  7  1 
Trini. Tobago, 1984  0.044  8  1 
Malaysia, 1995  0.044  5  -1 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4Table 3: Variables 
 
 
∆Checks: Change in institutions between period t and t-1. Proxy for the level of democracy 
(Checks and Balances) taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2002. 
 
∆Democ: Change in institutions between period t and t-1. Proxy for democracy taken from the 
database Polity IV.  
 
Oda: Share of ODA over GDP. ODA comes from OECD database. ODA is converted to 1985 
dollars with World Import Unit Value index from IMF 2002, series 75. GDP comes from PWT5.6.  
We update GDP using GDNGD. 
 
Oil: Share of rents from oil over GDP. Rents from oil comes from British Petroleum database. We 
compute barrels per years and multiply by the barrel price. Rents of oil are concerted to 1985 
dollars with World Import Unit Value index from IMF 2002, series75. GDP comes from PWT5.6. 
We update GDP using GDNGD. 
 
Sh_tot_neg: mean absolute value of the negative growth rate of the terms of trade over a five-years 
period. Terms of trade shows the national accounts exports price index divided by the imports price 
index, with 1995 equal to 100. Data comes from GDF, The World Bank.  
 
Sh_tot_pos : mean value of the positive growth rate of the terms of trade over a five-years period. 
Terms of trade shows the national accounts exports price index divided by the imports price index, 
with 1995 equal to 100. Data comes from GDF, The World Bank.  
 
Lpop: log of the population at the beginning of the period from the Penn World Tables 5.6. 
Updated using the data of the Global Development Network Growth Database.  
 
Lgdp: log of real GDP per capita at the beginning of the period from the Penn World Tables 5.6. 
Updated using the data of the Global Development Network Growth Database. 
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Table 4a: Basic regression (5-year periods)  
Endogenous variable : ∆checks 
 OLS  IV 
(cluster 
robust) 
GMM GMM 
(cluster 
robust) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Odat -0.03 
(-2.06) 
-0.09 
(-2.67) 
-0.08 
(-3.35) 
-0.08 
(-3.35) 
Oilrentst -0.003 
(-0.43) 
-0.01 
(-1.35) 
-0.01 
(-0.80) 
-0.01 
(-1.31) 
Sh_tot_negt -1.88 
(-1.37) 
-1.57 
(-1.19) 
-1.44 
(-1.25) 
-1.29 
(-1.06) 
Sh_tot_post 0.92 
(0.63) 
0.43 
(0.30) 
0.29 
(0.22) 
0.21 
(0.15) 
Checkst-1 -0.35 
(-7.64) 
-0.39 
(-6.03) 
-0.39 
(-6.96) 
-0.41 
(-6.63) 
Sargan test     p=0.78     
Hansen J test      p=0.65  p=0.57 
N  368 356  356 356 
       
                   
Note: Oda is a measure of the change in the stock of aid received by a country (net ODA (flow) over GDP), Oilrents is 
the size of rents of oil over GDP, Sh_tot_neg (pos) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of 
trade and checks(t-1) is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period as described by the DPI 
database. The instruments are basically the ones used by Burnside and Dollar (2000): the log of initial income, the 
logarithm of initial population and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests” (z), which are 
basically regional dummies. Time dummies are included in all the regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
  6Table 4b: First stage  
 
  
Constant 33.69 
 (12.05) 
Oilrents t     -0.03 
 (-1.63) 
Sh_tot_neg t -1.96 
 (-0.56) 
Sh_tot_pos t 2.12 
 (0.54) 
Checkst-1 -0.15 
 (-1.33) 
y t-1 -1.47 
 (-7.39) 
p t-1 -1.26 
 (-11.45) 
z_Egipt 2.29 
 (1.76) 
z_Franc Zone  -0.09 
 (-0.16) 
z_Central 
America      -0.37 
 (-0.57) 
z_Safrica 1.10 
 (2.29) 
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Table 5: Cross section regressions (1977-99)  
Endogenous variable: ∆Checks 
 
 OLS  Ord. 
Prob 
IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Odat -0.11 
(-2.01) 
-0.09 
(-2.68) 
-0.22 
(-1.94) 
Oilrentst -0.02 
(-0.82) 
-0.01 
(-1.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.64) 
Sh_tot_negt 4.22 
(0.33) 
3.95 
(0.50) 
8.17 
(0.50) 
Sh_tot_post -14.6 
(-1.07) 
-13.13 
(-1.57) 
-14.7 
(-0.86) 
Checkst-1 -0.65 
(-3.76) 
-0.75 
(-5.25) 
-0.70 
(-3.58) 
      
R
2 0.13 0.14   
N 73  73  64 
      
 
Note: Oda is a measure of the change in the stock of aid received by a country (net ODA (flow) over GDP), Oilrents is 
the size of rents of oil over GDP, Sh_tot_neg (pos) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of 
trade and checks(t-1) is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period as described by the DPI 
database. For the IV estimation the instruments are basically the ones used by Burnside and Dollar (2000): the log of 
initial income, the logarithm of initial population and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests” (z), 
which are basically regional dummies. 
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Table 6: Regressions with additional explanatory variable (5-year periods)  
Endogenous variable: ∆checks 
  Method of estimation GMM (cluster) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Odat -0.07 
(-2.60) 
-0.07 
(-2.17) 
-0.07 
(-2.12) 
-0.08 
(-2.45) 
-0.08 
(-2.39) 
Checkst-1 -0.39 
(-6.16) 
-0.33 
(-4.98) 
-0.34 
(-5.15) 
-0.31 
(-4.70) 
-0.31 
(-4.72) 
Oil dummy  0.03 
(0.30) 
0.05 
(0.35) 
0.07 
(0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
-0.004 
(-0.03) 
∆educ   -0.18 
(-1.34) 
 -2.47 
(-1.53) 
-0.25 
(-1.53) 
∆prim_educ    -0.27 
(-1.31) 
  
∆gap(male-
female) 
   0.02 
(1.48) 
  
∆urban_rate       0.004 
(0.18) 
0.002 
(0.10) 
∆ln(GDP)       0.12 
(0.28) 
       
N  412 307 306 246 246 
        
Note: Oda is a measure of the change in the stock of aid received by a country (net ODA (flow) over GDP), Oilrents is 
the size of rents of oil over GDP, Sh_tot_neg (pos) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of 
trade and Checks(t-1) is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period as described by the DPI 
database. The instruments are basically the ones used by Burnside and Dollar (2000): the log of initial income, the 
logarithm of initial population and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests” (z) , which are 
basically regional dummies. The additional explanatory variables are taken from Barro (1999): the oil country dummy, 
average schooling years in total population, average years of primary schooling in total education, the gap between 
male and female primary education, and the urbanization rate. Time dummies are included in all the regressions. 
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Table 7: Alternative definition for institutional change (5-year periods)  
Endogenous variable: ∆Democ 
 OLS  IV 
(cluster 
robust) 
GMM GMM 
(cluster 
robust) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Odat -0.06 
(-1.92) 
-0.12 
(-2.69) 
-0.11 
(-2.01) 
-0.11 
(-2.57) 
Oilrentst -0.01 
(-0.91) 
-0.02 
(-2.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.97) 
-0.02 
(-2.40) 
Sh_tot_negt -3.61 
(-1.55) 
-2.98 
(-1.20) 
-2.38 
(-1.09) 
-2.34 
(-1.00) 
Sh_tot_post 0.57 
(0.27) 
1.02 
(0.63) 
1.50 
(0.79) 
1.34 
(0.86) 
Democt-1 -0.22 
(-7.86) 
-0.24 
(-5.46) 
-0.21 
(-6.31) 
-0.21 
(-5.24) 
Sargan test     p=0.11     
Hansen J test      p=0.15  p=0.20 
N  474 459  459 459 
       
Note: Oda is a measure of the change in the stock of aid received by a country (net ODA (flow) over GDP), Oilrents is 
the size of rents of oil over GDP, Sh_tot_neg (pos) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of 
trade and Democ(t-1) is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period as described by the Polity 
IV database. The instruments are basically the ones used by Burnside and Dollar (2000): log of initial income, the 
logarithm of initial population and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests” (z) , which are 
basically regional dummies. Time dummies are included in all the regressions. 
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Table 8: Cross section regressions (1960-99, 1975-99)  
Endogenous variable: ∆Democ 
 
Sample 1960-99  1975-99 
Method OLS 
 
Ord. 
Prob  
IV 
 
OLS 
 
Ord. 
Prob  
IV 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Odat -0.67 
(-3.65)
-0.26 
(-3.68)
-0.91 
(-3.01)
-0.42 
(-3.31)
-0.15 
(-3.44) 
-0.63 
(-3.10) 
Oilrentst -0.19 
(-2.87)
-0.07 
(-2.72)
-0.21 
(-2.95)
-0.08 
(-1.77)
-0.03 
(-1.88) 
-0.13 
(-2.05) 
Sh_tot_negt -44.75 
(-1.73)
-13.94 
(-1.46)
-6.91 
(-0.21)
-28.80 
(-1.26)
-7.25 
(-0.94) 
-24.52 
(-0.92) 
Sh_tot_post 43.18 
(1.54) 
12.42 
(1.19) 
32.6 
(1.00) 
16.68 
(0.73) 
3.12 
(0.40) 
27.08 
(1.01) 
Democt-1 -0.83 
(-7.01)
-0.32 
(-5.96)
-0.84 
(-6.28)
-0.73 
(-7.22)
-0.28 
(-6.53) 
-0.75 
(-6.82) 
        
R
2 0.54  0.15  0.48  0.14  
N  57 57 48 79 79 69 
        
Note: Oda is a measure of the change in the stock of aid received by a country (net ODA (flow) over GDP), Oilrents is 
the size of rents of oil over GDP, Sh_tot_neg (pos) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of 
trade and Democ(t-1) is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period as described by the dataset 
Polity IV. For the IV estimation the instruments are basically the ones used by Burnside and Dollar (2000): the log of 
initial income, the logarithm of initial population and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests” (z), 
which are basically regional dummies. 
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Table 9: System GMM estimation (5-year periods)  
Endogenous variables: Democ and Checks  
 
 GMM  GMM 
collapsed
GMM 
 
 Democ  Democ Checks
 (1)  (3)  (2) 
Oda t -0.11 
(-2.34) 
-0.12 
(-2.48) 
-0.10 
(-2.65) 
Oilrents t -0.02 
(-2.22) 
-0.02 
(-2.32) 
-0.00 
 (-0.48)
Sh_tot_neg t -3.57 
 (-1.34) 
-0.42 
(-0.10) 
-4.05 
 (-2.42)
Sh_tot_pos t -0.75 
 (-0.29) 
2.04 
(0.71) 
3.69 
 (1.32) 
Democt-1 0.74 
 (10.15)
0.86 
(10.08) 
 
Checks t-1    0.44 
 (4.40) 
Constant 0.40 
(1.09) 
-0.19 
(-0.43) 
1.19 
(4.05) 
Instruments 70  30  41 
      
Hansen J test   P=0.15  P=0.21  P=0.37 
Diff. Hansen test      
a. Level eq.  P=0.57  P=0.88  P=0.30 
b. Exog. inst.  P=0.21  P=0.21  P=0.48 
c. Diff. eq.  P=0.33  P=0.17  P=0.46 
 m2   P=0.11  P=0.12  P=0.31 
N 456  456  295 
Note: Oda is a measure of the change in the stock of aid received by a country (net ODA (flow) over GDP), Oilrents is 
the size of rents of oil over GDP, Sh_tot_neg (pos) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of 
trade, and democ (t-1) and checks(t-1) is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period. The 
standard instruments are the ones used by Burnside and Dollar (2000) (log of initial income, logarithm of initial 
population and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests”, which are basically regional dummies) 
and the instruments generated by the system GMM method considering ODA and the lag institutions as endogenous 
variables. Z-tests based on Windmeijer’s robust standard errors estimation are included between parentheses. Time 
dummies are included in all the regressions. Difference-in-Hansen tests: a. Level eq. represents the test for the 
instruments of the level equations (exogenous variables and time dummies are not included); b. Exogenous 
instruments: tests the exogenous variables and the time dummies; c. Diff. eq: test for the moment conditions generated 
by the differences equations (exogenous variables and time dummies are not included).  
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Table 10: Regressions for the sample of countries with changes 
in democracy or checks and balances (IV estimation) 
 
  ∆Democ  ∆Checks 
 
    
Five-year periods  -0.32 
(-2.16) 
-0.24 
(-2.88) 
Cross section 
1960-99  
-1.07 
(-3.84) 
 
Cross section 
1965-99  
-0.91 
(-2.69) 
 
Cross section 
1970-99  
-0.98 
(-3.59) 
 
Cross section 
1975-99  
-0.77 
(-3.39) 
 
Cross section 
1977-99  
 -0.30 
(-2.00) 
Note: This table presents the parameter estimate for ODA in the basic regression where the sample has been 
constrained to the countries which have a positive (negative) change in institutions. Time dummies are included in all 
five-year regressions. 
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Table 11: Robustness to the elimination of outliers  
Endogenous variables: ∆Checks,  ∆Democ 
 OLS 
Cross 
Section 
OLS 
Cross 
Section 
IV 
Cross 
Section 
IV  
Cross 
Section 
IV  
Cross 
Section 
GMM 
5-years 
GMM 
5-years 
Endogenous 
Variable 
∆Checks  ∆democ 
1960-99 
∆Checks  ∆democ 
1960-99 
∆democ 
1975-99 
∆Checks  ∆democ 
  (6) (7) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) 
Odat -0.11 
(-2.22) 
-0.71 
(-2.59) 
-0.13 
(-1.91) 
-0.98 
(-2.59) 
-0.64 
(-2.78) 
-0.07 
(-3.03) 
-0.16 
(-3.04) 
Oilrentst -0.02 
(-1.04) 
-0.19 
(-2.84) 
-0.01 
(-0.37) 
-0.22 
(-2.93) 
-0.13 
(-2.01) 
-0.00 
(-0.43) 
-0.01 
(-1.15) 
Sh_tot_negt 3.47 
(0.41) 
-40.9 
(-1.42) 
6.17 
(0.63) 
-3.11 
(-0.09) 
-23.72 
(-0.81) 
-1.54 
(-1.42) 
-4.98 
(-2.43) 
Sh_tot_post -14.01 
(-1.60) 
40.6 
(1.38) 
-15.77 
(-1.53) 
31.06 
(0.93) 
26.89 
(0.97) 
0.61 
(0.45) 
2.84 
(1.58) 
Checkst-1 -0.88 
(-8.07) 
 -0.90 
(-7.50) 
   -0.38 
(-6.82) 
 
Democt-1  -0.83 
(-6.76) 
 -0.86 
(-6.12) 
-0.75 
(-6.71) 
 -0.18 
(-5.52) 
Sargan  test    P=0.40  P=0.08  P=0.22    
Hansen  test        p=0.42  p=0.17 
R
2 0.51  0.54       
N  70 55 63 47 67  353  444 
         
Note: Oda is a measure of the change in the stock of aid received by a country (net ODA (flow) over GDP), Oilrents is 
the size of rents of oil over GDP, Sh_tot_neg (pos) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of 
trade and Checks(t-1), and Democ(t-1) are the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period. The 
instruments are basically the ones used by Burnside and Dollar (2000): log of initial income, the logarithm of initial 
population and the group of variables that capture donors “strategic interests” (z) which are basically regional dummies. 
Time dummies are included in all the regressions. 
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Table 12: IV with alternative instruments  
Endogenous variable:  ∆Checks                              
 IV 
(cluster 
robust) 
IV 
(cluster 
robust) 
IV 
(cluster 
robust) 
IV 
(cluster 
robust)  
IV 
(cluster 
robust) 
IV 
(cluster 
robust) 
IV  
1980-
99 
IV 
1990-
99 
  5-year 5-year 5-year 5-year 5-year 5-year Cross 
Section 
Cross 
Section 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Odat -0.08 
(-2.55) 
-0.08 
(-2.57) 
-0.10 
(-2.70) 
-0.11 
(-2.41) 
-0.11 
(-3.06) 
-0.11 
(-3.03) 
-0.44 
(-2.22) 
-0.50 
(-1.94) 
Oilrentst -0.01 
(-1.29) 
-0.01 
(-1.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.89) 
-0.01 
(-0.95) 
-0.01 
(-1.00) 
-0.01 
(-1.55) 
-0.05 
(-1.14) 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
Sh_tot_negt -1.60 
(-1.22) 
-1.59 
(-1.21) 
-1.64 
(-1.23) 
-1.56 
(-1.14) 
-1.56 
(-1.16) 
-1.36 
(-1.01) 
1.08 
(0.07) 
8.29 
(0.72) 
Sh_tot_post 0.40 
(0.27) 
0.40 
(0.28) 
0.73 
(0.49) 
1.57 
(1.09) 
1.59 
(1.10) 
1.38 
(0.98) 
3.59 
(0.23) 
13.16 
(1.08) 
Checks t-1 -0.38 
(-5.99) 
-0.39 
(-6.00) 
-0.39 
(-5.81) 
-0.39 
(-6.06) 
-0.40 
(-5.88) 
-0.40 
(-6.05) 
-0.75 
(-3.42) 
-0.46 
(-2.76) 
Instruments 
Included 
Lgdp,  
Lpop, 
Excolo
ny 
Lgdp, 
Lpop, 
Strateg. 
Without 
safrica 
Lgdp, 
lpop, 
arms 
imports, 
Strateg. 
Lpop, 
arms 
imports, 
strateg. 
Arms 
imports, 
strateg. 
Strateg. Rajan&
Subram
anian 
Rajan&
Subram
anian 
Sargan  test  P=0.63 P=0.99 P=0.88 P=0.99 P=0.97 P=0.95     
          
N  356 356 339 349 349 368  61  58 
Note: Oda is a measure of the change in the stock of aid received by a country (net ODA (flow) over GDP), Oilrents is 
the size of rents of oil over GDP, Sh_tot_neg (pos) is the size of the absolute negative (positive) shock to the terms of 
trade and checks(t-1) is the level of institutional development at the beginning of the period. The instruments are 
specified in each regression. Time dummies are included in all the regressions. 
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